When designing alternative ways to an exit, we’ve encountered and worked with different ways of structuring the investor payback. The choice of these depends largely on the financial instruments used, the investment return, and the stage of the company. The variety of options might seem overwhelming at first and we will try to support you in finding out what works for you later on; what should become clear is that there is quite a lot of flexibility as to how to set up a structured exit. Most of the below can also be combined.
The main levers that can be adjusted in the structuring of the structured exit are:
In what manner will the investment be repaid?
Note that while regular payments ensure earlier liquidity for investors, if they start too early on, they might put too much strain on your business and lead to too much liquidity flowing out of the company too early. On the other side, bullet payments (paying the investment plus upside for investors back at one go) are often less attractive for investors as they bring higher risk and later payments. It also requires very good planning on your side as to how and when you will be able to amass the sum. In the past, we have also seen scenarios where regular payments were made up to a certain point in time/ certain milestones and afterwards the residual claim was due in one or several instalments. (So don’t feel limited by the options in the workshop template – you’ll come across it in Milestone 2 when you start mapping out your financing needs.)
If gradual payments are made, what determines how high they are?
Variable amounts: The regular payments are based on a percentage X of a specific variable of the company, like profits, revenues or other financial indicators, which are paid out until the investment cap is reached.
Profits: If profits are used as a variable, this means that companies that are not profitable don’t pay back anything at the beginning. This is good for the company that still needs liquidity to continue its development but might mean that some investors won’t be interested in the investment as they don’t foresee sufficient returns in the near future. However, relying on profits poses more risk for the investor, since the company could increase expenses in a given year to reduce profits and delay payments to the investor.
e.g. every year, a percentage X of the profits is paid to investors. This percentage can also be adapted over time.
Flexible payments: In some cases, whether repayments are made and at which height is up to the steward-owners and their judgment of the current performance and development of the company. In these cases, investors often want other forms of securities like put-options (right to redemption) that ensure that at some point in time they will receive compensation for their investment.
e.g. if the steward-owners deem it sensible for the company to pay out a sum X to their investors, they have the flexibility to do so. This can for example be combined with a right for the investors to trigger a full or partial repayment to set incentives for the steward-owners to regularly pay out something to investors.
In practice, investors often bring an expected time frame to the table – shaped by their fund structures or liquidity needs. While these conditions are naturally part of the negotiation, the timeline is usually not guaranteed. Some flexibility is needed on both sides. If there’s a significant gap between the investor’s time horizon and what the company can realistically deliver, secondary rounds can offer a solution – enabling the repayment of early investors in line with their needs, without putting pressure on the company’s operations or long-term mission.
Want to dive into some examples? We recommend exploring these case studies.
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